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$EVWUDFW
This paper analyzes Raúl Prebisch’s less familiar contributions to 
economic theory, related to the business cycle, and heavily informed by 
the Argentinean experience. His views of the cycle emphasize the 
common nature of the cycle in the center and the Latin American 
periphery as one unified phenomenon. While his rejection of orthodoxy is 
less than complete, some elements of what would become a more 
Keynesian position are developed. In particular, a preoccupation with the 
management of the balance of payments and the need for capital controls 
as a macroeconomic management tool, considerably before Keynes and 
White’s plans led to the Bretton Woods agreement. In the process it is 
clear that Prebisch developed several ideas that are still relevant to 
understand cyclical fluctuations in Latin America and the periphery in 
general, and became more concerned with the capacity of taking 
advantage of cyclical booms to maintain  sustained economic growth. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) is mostly known for his long-run analysis and 
diagnostic of the development problem of Latin America which he fully 
stated in “The Economic Development of Latin America and Some of its 
Principal Problems”, (1949 [1950]), also known as Prebisch’s 
‘Manifesto,’ and in “Growth, Disequilibrium and Disparities: 
Interpretation of the Process of Economic Development” (1950). At the 
same time a major concern, expressed in previous writings and more 
particularly during the period 1919-1949 was the fluctuations of the 
business cycle and its relationship to money and finance, to a great extent, 
a direct result of his experience with the management of the Argentine 
economy. 
His interest in the business cycle was inspired by the frequent and 
severe fluctuations experienced by the Argentine economy in both the 
XIXth and XXth centuries. While the episodes he analyzes (1822; 1867-
1880; 1881-1886; 1886-1891; 1899-1914; 1927-1933, 1935-1937, 1939-
1944) are very specific to their particular historical context, he argued that 
they were in their majority examples of a more generic type of cycle, a 
‘boom and bust cycle.’1 
                                                        
1  It is in this sense that we refer throughout the paper to these periods as Prebisch cycles. Prebisch’s analysis starts with 1822, the year 
of establishment of the first bank in Argentina. During the period covered in this paper, Prebisch held various posts in government 
and academia. He acted as head of the statistical unit of the Argentinean Rural Society in 1922 and later on in 1928 as advisor. He 
was professor of Economic Policy at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the National University of Buenos Aires (1924-1948); 
deputy director of the Argentine Department of Statistics (1925 to 1927); director of economic research for the National Bank of 
Argentina (1927 to 1930); under-secretary of finance (1930 to 1932); advisor to the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance; and in 
1935 he became the first Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina until 1943. See Dosman (2008). 
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According to Prebisch cycles were ‘natural’, ‘recurrent’ and inevitable facts of economic life. 
Moreover, he argued that the cycle phases were related. The sharpness of the contractionary phase was 
directly related to the excesses of the expansionary phase. Initially he held a monetary view of the cycle 
akin to that of Hawtrey, where financial flows played a crucial role as a triggering factor. In his analysis 
of the cycle he highlighted the role of expectations and speculation in ways, which are reminiscent of 
modern analyses of financial crises that were typical of the Scandinavian school of the time.2 
Eventually under the influence of the Great Depression he assigned a more prominent place to 
exports and external demand. This led him to introduce an antecedent to the Prebisch-Singer declining 
terms-of-trade hypothesis. At the same time, he provided an early development of Harrod’s foreign trade 
multiplier, which highlighted the Balance-of-Payments constraint to economic growth in developing 
countries.3 
A key component of his analysis of the cycle was to devise a policy strategy to extract the ‘boom’ 
and ‘bust’ character of the cycle. Prebisch sought that the creation of a Central Bank could indeed 
perform this task. Eventually he came to realize that a Central Monetary Authority could even go further 
and actually mitigate the amplitude of the fluctuation in the business cycle. These views not only led 
him to play an instrumental role in the creation of the Argentine Central Bank but also to introduce and 
recommend counter-cyclical economic policy actions including the undertaking of public works and 
infrastructure, the financing of industry, and the introduction of foreign exchange and capital controls, a 
discussion that preceded Keynes and White defense of capital controls at Bretton Woods. As part of his 
policy recommendations, and in consonance with current day views, Prebisch also favored international 
reserve accumulation as a precautionary measure to weather downturns. 
Eventually after having concentrated mainly in devising policies for mitigating economic 
contractions in Argentina, Prebisch’s attention turned, during and following WWII, towards taking 
advantage of the upward conditions of the cycle to achieve improved and sustained rates of growth. This 
led him to focus on the problem of economic growth in general, as he termed it, highlighting and 
underscoring the need to capture the required domestic policy space and autonomy to isolate, as much as 
possible, the national economy from the fluctuations of developed countries. Central to this viewpoint was 
the substitution of domestic for foreign production through the promotion of local industry. 
These ideas, jointly with the recognition that the observed economic cycle constituted a 
realization of a single global process, rather than a country specific phenomenon, whose impulses 
triggered by the cyclical center (first Great Britain and then the United States) were transmitted to the 
countries of the periphery (including Latin America), paved the way for the development of his later 
conceptual framework articulated in the ‘Development Manifesto’ and in ‘Growth, Disequilibrium and 
Disparities.’4 
This paper traces, analyzes and interprets critically Prebisch’s evolving views on the cycle and on 
money and highlights their current relevance, in face of changing economic circumstances.  Most of the 
focus is placed on the cycles prior to WWII. 
The article shows how Prebisch, starting with a very orthodox economic theory, was led by the 
force of events to partially change and adopt alternative views. However, his rejection with standard 
                                                        
2  On the role of Scandinavian, or Swedish, school, in particular its preoccupation with expectations and macroeconomic dynamics see 
Leijonhufvud (1981). Hawtrey and other Cambridge economists, like Keynes and Robertson, emphasized monetary shocks, in 
contrast to Wicksell and Schumpeter, which emphasized the role of real shocks as central for the trade cycle. Hawtrey worked at the 
Treasury, but was educated at Cambridge and was seen as a peripheral member of the same school of thought.  On Cambridge 
monetary ideas at that time see Bridel (1987). 
3  In this paper we follow McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) approach to the Balance-of-Payments Constraint.  
4  The Economic Development of Latin America and Some of its Principal Problems or the Prebisch ‘Manifesto’ was published in 1949 
as an introduction to the 1948 Economic Survey of Latin America and also appeared in the same year in The Revista Brasileira de 
Economia, No.3, pp. 47-109 and in El Trimestre Económico 16(63); 347-431, July-September and in 1950, in Revista de Ciencias 
Económicas, Buenos Aires, año 38, Serie III, No.22, March-April. In 1962 it appeared in the Boletín Económico de la América 
Latina, Vol. III, núm.1, February 1962. “Growth, Disequilibrium and Disparities: Interpretation of the Economic Development 
Process” constituted the first part of the 1949 Economic Survey of Latin America. 
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mainstream theory or what Prebisch in his writings calls ‘orthodox theory’ was far from complete. In 
general, throughout the period under study Prebisch remained committed to fiscal orthodoxy. 
Yet, it is clear that he did incorporate and developed elements of what would be Keynesian 
theory, adapted to the context of peripheral countries. In addition, the article argues that Prebisch 
thinking was very much in line with the current trend of economics at the time and in some instances 
was plainly at the forefront of economic thought as exemplified by his influence on Robert Triffin’s 
thinking on Central Banking issues. 
The paper is divided into seven sections. The first presents Prebisch’s typification of the 
Argentinean cycle. The second, third and fourth sections examine within Prebisch’s thinking the 
initiating factors of the cycle, the change from boom (expansionary phase) to bust (contrationary phase) 
conditions and the transmission mechanism in both phases. The fifth section centers on Prebisch’s views 
on the foreign trade multiplier and its role in the business cycle. Finally, sections six and seven analyze 
Prebisch’s changing views on monetary policy during the cycle and more generally those pertaining to 
policy autonomy. These also discuss the evolution of his conception of the cycle from a country specific 
phenomenon to that of a single universal process.5 
                                                        
5  All English translations of sources in French and in Spanish that follow including Prebisch’s Works (Vols. I to IV) are by the authors 
of this paper. Brackets in quotes were introduced by the authors. Throughout the text Prebisch’s Works are cited as RP with the 
respective volume and page(s) numbers. 
 





According to Prebisch, boom and bust cycles were a pervasive feature of 
Argentina’s economic history. In the writings analyzed in this paper 
covering the period from 1820 to 1944, he identified and analyzed, albeit 
not with the same depth and detail, eight business cycles, the majority of 
which took place under a regime of convertibility.6 Their time span and 
comparison with other authors for the period Prebisch studied is shown in 
Table 1. A more detailed depiction is provided in Table A-1 in the annex 
describing the main features of the monetary regimes associated with each 
of the Prebisch cycles. 
Prebisch perceived cycles, for the most part, as by other economists 
at the time, as recurrent and inevitable facts of economic life, or more 
precisely as ‘natural’ economic phenomena. Cycles were by definition 
generic with symmetric and necessarily continuing upward and downward 
phases and independent of historical time and space. Moreover, the 
intensity of the bust (downward phase) was dependent on the excesses of 
the boom (upward phase).7 
 
                                                        
6  See, Cortés Conde (2001), Gurrieri (2001), Mallorquin (2006; 2007) and O’Connell (2001)  for analyses covering, with differing 
degrees of detail and depth, Prebisch’s  thinking on business cycles and monetary issues. 
7  This view is made explicit in Pareto’s Cours D’Économie Politique (1896-1897) with which Prebisch was familiar. Pareto (1897, 
Vol. II, pp. 277-297), also believed that the term crisis should apply to both the boom and bust (expansion and contraction), that is to 
the complete cycle and Prebisch was in agreement (Vol. I, p. 118, note 54). The following quote by Pareto (1897, Vol. II, p.278) 
encapsulates both ideas: “In truth of the matter we reserve the most often this term [crisis] for the descending period of the 
oscillation, when prices fall, but in reality, this period is narrowly linked to the ascending period, when prices increase.; the former 
cannot subsist without the latter, and it is to their ensemble for which should be reserved the term crisis.” 




























































The regularity of their occurrence and movement, and their lack of specificity and historical 
contingency held sway in Prebisch’s thinking even until the start of the Great Depression. As he put it 
(RP, Vol. I, p. 618):  
“…it is thus evident, the cyclical character of the disturbances with which the year 1929 end and 
with which begins the current year [1930]. It is a short-term phenomenon; a period of descent of the 
undulatory movement that characterizes normally the evolution of any country; it is a superficial 
fact; that by itself does not affect the economic structure of the national economy, nor that carries 
significant deviations in the persistent ascending direction of its economic activities.”8 
Cycles, their phases and turning points, were mainly driven by external factors including the 
conditions in international liquidity and financial markets. While throughout his writings he presents 
examples of the effects of internal monetary expansion on the economy, he did not believe that the cycle 
was generated by domestic factors.  As he put it (RP, Vol. III, p. 371): “I have not observed, neither in 
the cycles I have seen closely nor in those that I have studies in our history, the existence of domestic 
elements with the sufficient force to promote, by itself, our wave motion.” 
The fact that the cycle was generated by exogenous factors marked for Prebisch, at this stage of 
his thinking,  a fundamental difference between the theories put forward to explain the cycle in a 
primary product exporter such as Argentina and those that sought to explain the cycle in the larger 
industrialized countries. 
Yet, in fact, he tenaciously held on to a monetary theory, and even to a pure monetary theory, of 
the trade cycle throughout his writings, conceptually articulated around the quantity theory of money 
                                                        
8  The events of the year 1929 were viewed as a further extension of the 1927-1928 cycle.  Initially he dated the ascending phase of the 
cycle between May 1927 and September 1928 (RP, Vol, I. p. 587). Later on however, once the effects of the year 1929 were visible 
in the Argentine economy he states that the descending phase of the cycle started during 1929 with some symptoms appearing by the 
middle of 1928 (Ibid. p.613). This point is also emphasized in his 1934 article The Present Moment of Our Economy. He states (RP, 
Vol. II., p. 158): “If we were to judge the year 1933…by the evolution of our agricultural exports, we would only be able to say that 
it was an additional year of contraction adding to those that have …the Argentine economy since 1929.” Prebisch came to realize the 
distinct character of the Great Depression when he became aware of the profound contraction in agricultural prices. The contraction 
was so sharp that the agricultural price index reached levels that it had not witnessed since the nineteenth century. As he put it (Ibid., 
p.346-347 and also 135): “The collapse in prices…does not constitute the usual phenomenon of cyclical reaction…rather an intense 
and pertinent decline to positions each time farther away from the level on which developed the relations of production and credit.” 
And (p. 135) “It [the decline in agricultural prices] is not a simple return to a previous situation, but of an accentuated and 
progressive contraction of values, that violently upsets the economic structure of the country.” 
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and the circulation velocity of money, concepts which in fact were was also used to explain the cycle in 
the more developed countries. In this regard, besides the influences of Argentinean figures such as, 
Norberto Piñero9 and Juan B. Justo,10 or Luis Roque Gondra,11 the cycle analysis of Prebisch bore the 
visible and notorious stamp of Irving Fisher (1911), Ralph Hawtrey ([1919], 1950), Frank Taussig 
([1911], 1917, 1927), Vilfredo Pareto (1896-1897) and also Clément Juglar (1862).12 
                                                        
9  Norberto Piñero was minister of finance of Argentina twice from March to September 1906 and from April to July 1913 under the 
presidencies of José Figueroa Alcorta (1906-1910) and Roque Saenz Peña (1910-1914) respectively. He also held the Chair of 
Banking at the Faculty of Economic Science and Prebisch studied under him (See Caravaca and Plotkin, 2007). In 1921, Piñero 
published the book, Money, Credit and Banks in Argentina whose aim was to study the current problems of the time in Money and 
Banking in light of the teachings of the past. The critical reading of the book by Prebisch prompted him to write “Annotations to our 
circulating media” (1921) (RP, Vol. I. pp.93-175, through which in fact he provided a monetary and financial history of Argentina 
from the establishment of the first bank in 1822 to the demise of the 1899 Coversion Caisse experiment in 1914. Prebisch was critical 
of the book. Prebisch thought that on the one hand Argentine economists and money and banking scholars, described events with an 
‘overwhelming static objectivity,’ they had frequently ignored the most important ones focusing instead on the superficial ones. 
Moreover their explanation of events was based on fortuity and contingency. On the other hand, they were attracted to the study of  
the judicial character of institutions and the monotonous exegesis of laws and decrees whose influence was highly questionable and 
to the research of the intention of the legislator rather than the inquiry of reality’ (RP, Vol. I., p. 94). Presbich thought that Piñero’s 
book did not fill the existing vacuum although he did praise Piñero for avoiding originality (or the ideas of monetary cranks) in his 
study of present day problems. In a later interview in 1983, he termed the book ‘an intellectual disaster’ (see, Mallorquin, 2006, p.8)). 
In his Annotations (p.95), he states that the works of J.H Williams ([1920] (1969) and E. Lorini (1902) ‘opened up a new horizon on 
our monetary problems and indicated the method to follow in their study.’ (this even though he later claimed that Williams was in his 
book ‘disconcerted but with very penetrating observations’ (Mallorquin, op.cit.)). Williams was part of the Harvard School and a 
disciple of Frank Taussig, and thus a follower of the quantity theory of money and orthodox monetary views as was Piñero and even 
Prebisch himself in his annotations. The differences with Piñero may have been overstated and may not have been of substance as 
both Prebisch, at this stage, and Piñero shared the same theoretical framework, a framework acquired by Prebisch, probably, in part 
from the lectures of Piñero himself.  
10  Juan B. Justo (1865-1925) was a multidimensional intellectual (medical doctor, journalist a member of parliament, writer on different 
topics including money) who founded the Argentina Socialist Party and translated into Spanish the first volume of Karl Marx’s Das 
Kapital (Portantiero, 1999). He was nonetheless at the same time a believer in Free Trade and in the Gold Standard and in ‘sound 
money.’ As he put it: “Sound gold money or convertible paper money convertible at par must be a postulate of the international 
working class, especially in countries such as those of South America, where the debasement of the currency is one of the preferred 
ways to intensify the exploitation of the worker.” In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies in 1913 (September, 24), he praised the 
establishment of the 1899 Conversion Caisse, for restoring monetary normality. Justo published a Tract on monetary issues ((Money, 
(La Moneda)) in 1903. Prebisch attended Justo’s lectures at the university and became a supporter and admirer of Justo’s ideas 
including those related to the Gold Standard and Free Trade until the Great Depression. In 1919, Prebisch read Justo’s translation of 
Marx’s first volume of Capital. He praised Justo’s Tract of Money and thought it ‘a required reading for those interested in the 
monetary problems of Argentina’ (See, “Studies on Money. J.B. Justo. Third Edition. Buenos Aires.1921”. Reproduced in RP, Vol. 
I., pp. 55-60).   
11  Luis Roque Gondra (1881-1946) taught economics at the Faculty of Economics Science of the University of Buenos Aires (1913) 
and became full professor in 1922. He was influenced by Pareto, the Italian marginalists such as Maffeo Pantaleoni (1857-1924) and 
Enrico Barone (1859-1924) and the Lausanne School. In 1917 he translated Pantaleoni’s book Pure Economics (1889) and taught the 
first course on mathematical economics in Argentina in 1918. In 1933 he published his Elements of Political Economy. His teaching 
shaped Prebisch’s favourable views of Pareto and other Italian neo-classical economists. Prebisch translated the first Spanish version 
of Barone’s Principles (1908), initially assigned to Mauricio Nierentsein (1877-1937), which appeared in 1926. The translation was 
revised and extended by Gondra and a second version appeared in 1931 failing to mention Prebisch and Nierenstein (Fernández-
López 2002, Prebisch, 1986). Prebisch considered Nierenstein as very influential in shaping his thought although did not provide 
details. He was a man of vast culture and learning, though not an economist by profession. He held the position of professor of 
Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics Science of the University of Buenos Aires in the 1920’s. He was also the university's 
administrative secretary.  Both Gondra and Nierenstein proposed Prebisch as Associate Professor in 1923.  
12  By the time he wrote his Annotations, Prebisch was well acquainted with the North American and European economic literature on 
the cycle. He possessed a detailed knowledge of some of Fisher’s work including the Purchasing Power of Money (1911) and 
Stabilizing the Dollar (1920) (See, RP, Vol. I, pp.14-17, and pp. 116-127). His mentor Alejandro Bunge had been in contact with 
Fisher regarding index numbers (Imaz, 1974).  Prebisch attributed a strong influence to Taussig’s works including his Economic 
Principles ([1911], 1915; See RP, Vol. I p.181, Ibid.)  and his trade theory, as attested by his continuous references to Williams (a 
Taussig disciple), whose book on Argentina Prebisch translated into Spanish in 1922, and also by Prebisch’s own remarks on Taussig 
(Pollock at Al., 2002, p.537). He had also read Tugan-Baranowsky,([1894], 1912) and the Italian marginalists authors (Prebisch 
learned to read Itialian in secondary school), and adopted Pareto’s (1897) definition of crisis (see footnote 6 above). Finally his 
arguments in favour of liquidation as a necessary stage of the cycle (see footnotes 37 and 38) are too close to those of Juglar’s (1860) 
theory to ignore that influence even if it came from indirect or secondary sources. Cortés Conde (2001) mentions in passim the 
influence of Hawtrey’s 1919 Currency and Credit in Prebisch’s early thinking.  
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In consonance with this approach Prebisch gave predominance to ‘changes in the flow of money’ 
as the main cause of business cycle fluctuations.13 At first he placed the emphasis on financial flows, 
determined on the demand side by Argentina’s financing needs and on the supply side by the liquidity 
stance of developed countries (Great Britain and the United States), as the triggering factor leading to a 
subsequent expansion of liquidity, prices and the improvement in business outlook and conditions. In so 
doing, he underscored what he termed to be the ‘subjective factors’ of the cycle such as speculation, 
business expectations, euphoria and contagion as important factors in maintaining the momentum of the 
boom (expansionary phase) very much in line with a Kindleberger & Aliber ([1978] 2005; 1984) type 
explanation ‘DYDQWODOHWWUH¶14
Following the dip in agricultural prices provoked by the Great Depression which led Prebisch to 
formulate an antecendent of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, his attention shifted to export variations as 
the initiating cause of economic fluctuations. Even though, the perturbations originated in real factors 
such as the terms-of-trade and external aggregate demand, the consequent changes in the flow of money, 
expenditure and the circulation velocity of money still played a central role in his explanation of the 
cycle. 
His focus on export variations inevitably led Prebisch to develop the other side of the coin, the 
role of imports and its relationship to exports. More precisely, changes in exports resulted in expenditure 
variations some of which then leaked to imports. The extent of the leakage and hence the domestic 
impact of an export change depended on the size of the propensity to import. By construct Prebisch 
arrived in the early 1930’s at ‘the coefficient of expansion’ or in more known terms, at the foreign trade 
multiplier. 
His analysis of the foreign trade multiplier was a static one, an explanation of a change from one 
position of equilibrium to another, for a given circulation velocity of money and a constant propensity to 
import. The generation of cycles required changes in either one or both of these variables. It was on this 
basis that he distinguished his analysis from that of Keynes multiplier approach emphasizing the latter’s 
limitations, notwithstanding his  recognition of the importance of Keynes’s *HQHUDO 7KHRU\ RI
(PSOR\PHQW,QWHUHVWDQG0RQH\ (1936) (GT, thereafter).15 It is clear that the severity of the balance of 
payments problems in the 1930s and his experience as director of the central bank led to this early 
preoccupation with the open economy dimension of the multiplier, and to develop a view of the balance 
of payments as a limit to the level of activity in peripheral countries. 
The development of his views on the cycle did not alter his belief that these were inevitable, with 
recurrent and symmetric upward and downward phases, and ultimately ‘natural.’ Nonetheless, he 
became convinced over time that policy could extract the ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ character of the cycle 
through orderly and centralized interventions, avoiding thus the excesses of the upward phase of the 
cycle and hence the painful adjustment of contraction and liquidation, of which he had become aware 
partly through experience and partly through his reading of Gesell (1891; 1909) and Keynes (1923). 
Such was one of the tasks assigned to the Central Bank, whose creation in 1935, on the basis of 
Prebisch’s ideas, followed the abandonment, in 1929, of the fetters imposed on policy by the Gold 
Standard.  Fundamental to this task was the use of open market, foreign market exchange operations and 
                                                        
13  Haberler (1952, p. 15) characterizes the purely monetary explanation of the business cycle as one in which “changes in the flow of 
money are the sole and sufficient cause of changes in economic activity, of the alteration of prosperity and depression.” In Prebisch 
as will be obvious, changes in the flow of money occur through external sector changes, variations in financial flows and export 
revenue. 
14  Also note that at the time Prebisch introduced distinguished between the objective and subjective elements of the cycle, expectations 
was part and parcel of the explanation of the trade cycle in Cambridge (England). One year after Prebisch wrote his ‘Annotations of 
our own circulating medium (1921), Lavington published the first edition of his trade cycle, where confidence, anticipations and 
contagion played an essential role.  
15  See, Prebisch’s (1947) and (Vol. IV. pp. 244-361). 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 127 Understanding the business cycle in Latin America… 
15 
controls, moral suasion and, most important for its current day relevance, reserve accumulation for 
precautionary purposes.16 
In practice the Central Bank not only acted to extract the ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ character of the cycle, 
but in fact, aware of the detrimental effects of the 1937 contraction, came eventually to mitigate the 
amplitude and intensity of its regular fluctuations and thereafter, following the start of WWII, to 
implicitly target domestic activity, through counter-cyclical policy.17 The consideration of two targets, 
the stability of money and that of output, seems to have led Prebisch to consider the possibility of a 
short-run inflation-output trade off, one of the central pillars of modern macroeconomics, however 
crudely stated at the time. 
Prebisch’s thrust for policy autonomy, his counter cyclical stance and experiments with different 
sets of instruments including foreign exchange and import controls, helped to shape Robert Triffin’s 
views on central banking who led in the 1940’s a series of US Federal Reserve financial missions to 
Latin America.18 However, it should be noted, that counter-cyclical actions remained for the most part 
confined mainly to monetary policy since Prebisch, except for a few occasions, remained committed to 
fiscal orthodoxy. 
Prebisch not only focused on policy design to dampen cycle fluctuations and thus output 
volatility, but also devised an approach to take advantage of expansions to achieve sustained growth 
over time without exacerbating the conditions of the upward phase of the cycle.   Besides considering 
the use of capital controls, he recommended during and after WWII insulating the domestic economy 
from international disruptions.  This required a process of substitution of domestic industry and 
production for foreign goods. This call for national policy space and autonomy is reminiscent of 
Keynes’s long-standing concern with creating the conditions under which countries could freely pursue 
domestic objectives, including full employment, and predates that of modern day Keynesians such as 
James Tobin.19 
Towards the middle of the 1940’s he became convinced that, cycles were not a national and 
country phenomenon. Rather cycles were global in nature and the observed country cycles, such as 
those of Argentina, were in fact part of the realization of a single-global cycle process. Cycles were 
initiated in developed countries, due to their economic importance, and more specifically in the 
economically predominant developed country at the time (first the United States and then Great Britain) 
or as Prebisch called it in the cyclical center. Countries such as those of Latin America who are subject 
to the effects of the economic impulses generated by the cyclical center were considered as the 
periphery. 
Following this line of thought, Prebisch argued for the need to articulate a universal and general 
cycle theory, encompassing the analysis of the different phases of economic activity in the periphery and 
in the center as well as their interaction. Far from being fully developed, the general cycle theory or as 
he called it, the ‘theory of economic dynamics,’ remained at the level of class lecture notes. Prebisch did 
                                                        
16  The introduction of foreign exchange controls (which lasted until the 1940’s) for the first time in 1931 was prior to the creation of the 
Central Bank. See Table 8 in the Annex for further details. The ultimate goal of this measure is unclear. In Pollock et al. (2002, p. 
544), it seems the ultimate goal at this time of exchange controls and other measures was to reduce the fiscal deficit, a very orthodox 
measure and in this sense a far cry from a counter cyclical stance. In Mallorquín (2006), Prebisch seems to emphasize the goal of 
softening the external constraint and terms the 1931 imposition of exchange controls, a ‘heterodox move.’ 
17  Prebisch dates the beginnings of counter-cyclical policy to 1933 probably influenced by Keynes’ Means to Prosperity (1933) and 
also by the failure of the World Economic Conference. See, RP, Vol. I., pp.146; Vol. IV, p.126 and 139). In the 1930’s counter-
cyclical policy was recommended by a majority of economists at the time on both sides of the Atlantic including J.H. Williams. 
18  According to Helleiner (2009, p. 18): “Triffin frequently cited his debt to Prebisch’s ‘pioneering work’ in his publications… Triffin 
did not just draw on Prebisch’s ideas in his own work but also invited him on various Federal Reserve Board financial missions, 
including the all-important Paraguayan mission [1945].”  
19  Well known examples include Keynes defence of ‘National Self-Sufficiency,’ his proposal for ‘controls on capital movement’ as a 
way to render inoperative the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity theorem (which he put forward in 1923) allowing countries to regain 
control of interest rate policy, his opposition to free trade, and in general his Currency Union Proposal.  For his part James Tobin 
(1974, p. 92) has justified his Tobin Tax by “…the need to protect national autonomy in stabilization policy by deliberately contrived 
obstacles to international flow of funds.” 
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not incorporate the accelerator dynamics, which was typical of other endogenous approaches to business 
fluctuations of the time e.g., Kalecki (1933), Clark (1935b), Harrod (1936), and Samuelson (1939). 
Nevertheless, this incipient theory of economic dynamics besides being built around the better 
known concepts of center and periphery, also incorporated those of capital accumulation and 
technological progress, associated with Prebisch’s name and which were to play such a central role in 
the development of his thinking on Latin American Industrialization during his ECLAC years (1948(9)-
1963).20 
                                                        
20  In late 1948, Raúl Prebisch accepted a short-term position at the newly formed Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, 
later renamed as ECLAC to officially include the Caribbean in its denomination), who’s Executive Secretary was Gustavo Martinez-
Cabañas. Prebisch was only appointed Executive Secretary in 1950 after the Montevideo Conference (Dosman, 2008, p. 265). It is 
important to note that while Prebisch was developing Keynesian ideas adapted to the particular circumstances of peripheral countries, 
his participation in the conservative governments of the 1930s, his dismissal from the central bank by the government of the 1943 
military coup, and his troubled relation with the Peronist government (1946-55), in Argentina he would not be seen as particularly 
Keynesian, and his policy advise would be seen as contradictory to his international policy positions.  See Sikkink (1988). 




Up until the time of the Great Depression, the initiating factor of the 
Prebisch cycle is international borrowing (i.e., a capital transfer) which 
leads to an increase in metallic (specie) reserves.  This follows closely the 
views advanced by Taussig (1917, 1927) whose analysis also emphasized 
the effects of international borrowing (capital transfer) on the external and 
liquidity positions and on prices.21 
At the beginning of the second cycle (1867-1876), studied by 
Prebisch metallic (specie) reserves tripled between 1867 and 1871(3.5 and 
10.5 million pesos) and reached its maximum in 1872 (15.4 million 
pesos). Prebisch attributes the increase in metallic reserve mainly to public 
and to a lesser extent to private loans.22 As he put it (RP, Vol. I, p. 115): 
 
                                                        
21  Taussig emphasized the effects on both the lender and borrowing country. See also appendix C (“The Harvard Neoclassical School”) 
in Bordo (1984).   
22  Available evidence of foreign inflows to Argentina dates back to the year 1865 which coincides with the start of the Triple Alliance 
War. According to Ferns (1950 p. 27) British investment in joint stock enterprises and public funds reached 5.4 million pounds 
during that year, twice that registered for the first year available, 1857. Stone (1968 and 1977) provides a lower estimate of the order 
of 2.7 million pounds of which 80% corresponded to government debt. The seminal study by Peters (1934, p.23) provides a similar 
estimate of government external debt flows (2.5 million pounds). However, effectively Argentina received a smaller amount. The 2.5 
million pound loan was first reduced first to 1.25 million pounds due to ‘strained conditions of the market after a period of intense 
speculation’ and then only half a million pounds was subscribed due to the increase in the rate of interest by the Bank of England 
making Argentine Bonds ‘unattractive’ (Ibid).22 The rest of the loan was issued in 1868. Peters, Ibid, also attributes the failure to 
subscribe the full amount of the loan responds to that fact this was the first time that the Argentine Republic appeared in the London 
money market. In the past as in 1824, the Buenos Aires province issued loans. As put by Peters, Ibid, “Besides the unfavourable 
conditions in the money market, the lack of knowledge of and confidence in the Argentine Republic, as distinct from Buenos Aires 
led to the failure of the attempt.” 
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“The flow of public loans began with vigour in 1868, reaches its maximum between 1871 and 1873 
and became extinguished in 1874 until the next decade.  Besides these and other public loans, the 
country began to borrow significant volumes of foreign capital for the development of productive 
forces, attracted by the relative pacification of the country.” 
And (ibid. p. 119): 
“The external loans undertaken by the country between 1867 and 1873 must have been considerable. 
They not only allowed the increase of internal circulation of money, but also made possible the 
extraordinary swelling of imports, stimulated by the increase in prices following the inflation and by 
the reigning atmosphere of artificial prosperity that incited imports to over evaluate their 
needs….Without loans the country would not have been able to pay for the considerable import sum; 
as well loans explain the paradox of an unfavourable trade balance and the increase in the stock of 
metallic currency in the country.” 
A similar depiction is provided as the basis for the third cycle (1881-1885) analyzed by Prebisch 
(ibid. p. 138): 
“…the fundamental fact about imports of metallic and foreign loans is to have acted as objective 
causes of a new ascendant period [1881-1884], analogous to the previous crisis. Real estate property, 
whose values became depressed towards the end of that one, began once again to inflate its prices. 
Businesses became more active in the heat of greater credit facility and in turn reacted on it, in the 
sense of greater expansion; this credit abundance was based was founded upon in the increase in real 
capital of the official banks…constituted by gold loans, and in the growth of deposits due to a 
greater amount of monetary circulation.”23 
History repeated itself in 1887 as Argentina received inflows of foreign financial flows initiating 
Prebisch’s fourth economic cycle. For this particular cycle, inflows are explained mainly by private 
sector operations (including railway construction, foreign exchange operation related to real estate 
properties (the issue of the so-called ‘FpGXODV’)) and to a lesser extent by governmental loans. Available 
data shows that between 1886 and 1888, total loans increased from 67 to 247 million gold pesos. 
Thereafter the demand for loans declined. The share of foreign loans to the private sector, which 
represented 38% of the total in 1886, increased its share significantly and accounted for roughly 70% of 
total loans on average from 1887 to 1891 (See Figure 1 below). Of the total private sector loans, 41% 
originated in real estate property deals and 48% in railroad infrastructure on average (Di Tella & 
Zymelman, 1973, p. 35, Table 2).   
The same phenomenon occurs following the Conversion Law of 1899 and in 1927 during the 
brief restoration of convertibility. In the former case the stock of metallic currency more than doubles 
between 1905 and 1912 increasing from 139 to 291 million pesos. In the latter case, it increased by 38% 
between the beginning of 1927 and the first half of 1928. This evidence prompted Prebisch to repeat his 
adagio in the case of the 1899 convertibility experiment (Ibid, p.165): “… at the heat of foreign gold, a 
new ascending period of a crisis was incubated, analogous in many aspects to those that preceded the 
collapses of 1875, 1885 and 1890.” 
The facility with which Argentina received financial flows in the initiating years of the above 
cycles reflected no doubt the conditions prevailing in the international monetary markets and in 
                                                        
23  There is no available evidence quantifying the value of external financial flows for this cycle. Ferns (1950), presents evidence for the 
years, 1957, 1865, 1875, 1885, 1890, 1900. For his part Stone (1977) shows data for the years 1865, 1875, 1885, 1905 and 1913 
respectively. It should be noted that starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Argentinean government also managed to 
obtain funds from the issue of internal bonds and that the government also obtained resources from the selling of land. 
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particular those of the London market.24 Starting in the second half of the 19th Century, Great Britain 
became a leading financial center and the main investor in Latin America accounting for roughly 44% of 
world total on average between 1875 and 1924. Between that time and 1913, British foreign investment 
in Argentina increased from 23 to 480 million pounds allowing the country to raise its Latin American 
British share from 13% to 41%. 25 
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24  Britain experienced an economic boom from 1858 to 1873. During this period important changes took place in the London money 
market. Morgan (1965) emphasizes two major changes. The first is the “growth of the international acceptance business.” This was 
fundamental in transforming London into an international banking center. As he puts it (Ibid, p. 167): “In the 1850’s [international 
acceptance business] the system was extended so that bills drawn by a foreign house on a firm in a third country were accepted by a 
London firm and so rendered available for discount in the London market. …a large part of the trade in the world came to be 
financed, and London became a sort of clearing house for international payments.” The second change is that as a result of political 
and civil disturbances in the nineteenth century (including the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War), of which Britain 
was free money flowed to the London financial market. In 1873, Europe and the United States were subject to severe financial crises. 
The consequences lasted until 1880 when financial and real activity recovered maintaining the pace of recovery until 1884. The next 
recovery phase stated in 1887 lasting until the Baring crisis (1890-1891).  
25  As table 2 shows, Argentina’s share of British investments in Latin America grew over time. The division of British inflows into, 
direct and portfolio investment, shows that while the latter was an important source of finance, over time, it diminished in importance 
in relation to the former.  
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The influence of external conditions was recognized by Prebisch early on in his analyses of the 
second cycle and played a significant and growing role in his explanations of the Argentina cycle in 
general. As he argued: “The ascending period of the Argentine Crisis…develops in parallel to the 
ascending period of a general European crisis that explodes in Vienna in 1873” (RP, Vol. I., p. 126 note 
66). 26 In a similar vein he would explain in 1929 as he recapitulated his views on the Argentina cycle 
(RP Vol. I, p.553): “In their periods of abundance… European countries… lent us freely their 
capitals…in so far as those conditions were maintained we could easily cover the financial services due 
on those capitals...” 
Prebisch came to the realization that besides financial flows, changes in the conditions that 
affected export performance could also act as initiating factors of the economic cycle. But he introduced 
export performance into the cycle as he became aware that agricultural prices had registered a declining 
trend since the middle of the 1920’s and that the Great Depression sharply aggravated this contraction 




















































































Available data presented by Prebisch for 1900-1933 shows that the trend of agricultural prices 
increased between 1900 and 1925 (5% yearly average) and thereafter declined (-7% on average between 
1925 and 1933). The decline was steeper following the start of the Great Depression.  In fact, Prebisch 
argued that the contraction was so sharp that the agricultural price index reached levels around 1933 that 
it had not witnessed since the nineteenth century.  The comparison with the situation in industrialized 
countries whose manufacturing export prices had not decreased and in some case had actually risen led 
inevitably to terms-of-trade considerations (RP Vol. II, p. 188-191), most likely providing an antecedent 
                                                        
26  The 1873 crisis is considered the first ‘authentic global financial crisis’ (Marichal, 2009). It effects were felt in several Latin America 
countries including Argentina.  Several Argentine authors including Francisco Balbín, Rufino Varela, O. Garridós, J. Terry, and Juan 
Bautista Alberdi, among others, analized its effects on Argentina. 
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to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis more concerned with the cyclical downturns of the terms of trade than 
with the secular trend.27  
Thus by the early 1930’s the fluctuations in the economic cycle were seen as dependent on both 
the conditions in international monetary markets and export performance. He explains it in the following 
way in an article titled The Economic State (1930) (RP, Vol. I., p. 634): “Recently, we referred to the 
predominating influence on our monetary cycle of the events in the international money market in New 
York, as before the war it happened with that of London. It is to be pointed now the consequences that    
for Argentina the variations in foreign purchasing power.”28 
A similar but more developed and sophisticated statement was provided eight years later in “The 
Economic Cycle and Monetary Policy” (1938) stating in a straightforward manner (RP Vol. II. P. 647-
648): “… in the development of our wave motion prevail, on the one side, the variations of the physical 
volume of soil production, its prices and the degree of absorption of the products in the international 
market, and on the other side, the more of less affluence of foreign capital… The intensity of our cycles 
not only depends on the isolated force of each of these factors, but also on the form and opportunity 
with which they are juxtaposed joining in their action o neutralizing it between them in a variable 
degree.”29 
                                                        
27  Prebisch (RP Vol. II, p. 191) quotes from the League of Nations (1932-1933) World Economic Survey, making the point that in those 
years, the purchasing power (terms-of-trade) of agricultural countries declined while that of industrialized countries increased due to 
a relative greater fall in their import, than export prices. Data presented for five industrialized countries (Germany, the United States, 
France, Great Britain and Switzerland) shows that all managed to improved their terms-of-trade between 1929 and 1933 (45%, 33%, 
16% 20% and 12% respectively). By contrast, data for five agricultural countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark and New 
Zealand) for 1929-1931 show a worsening of the terms-of-trade (-32%, -35%, -10%, -16%, and -38% respectively). The Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis refers to a secular decline in developing countries terms-of-trade with industrialized countries. The hypothesis was 
put forward by Prebisch and Singer in 1950 independently. See RP, Vol. IV, Singer (1950 and 1987), Palma (1987). 
28  Prebisch similarly argues (ibid. p. 201) : “It is a well known fact that that the movements of our external trade constitute the decisive 
factor in the great changes of the Argentinean economic situation. We are linked in a very straight manner with the international 
economy and exposed to all of its changes. When the world market increases its absorption of our products…the acquisitive power of 
the population increases immediately; first in rural production….propagating throughout the entire field  of our domestic economy 
translating into a more active demand for merchandises, both foreign and nationally made.”  
29  Note that Prebisch acknowledges that the impulse provided by foreign capital can refer to both short and long run capital flows. He 
was clearly aware that short run capital is quick silver capital and leads to greater instability and can provoke changes in economic 
activity that are greater than those brought about by long term movements. (See, RP Vol. II, 307-313; Vol. III., p. 232; Vol. III, pp. 
325 and 328-329. “From the point of view of the balance of payments, the inflow of short run capital flows in the same way as long 
run capital, stimulates imports, as a consequence the gold or foreign exchange that originally had entered under this concept flow out 
again due to the payment of imports. But if after that short term capital flows out unexpectedly it will be necessary to dispose of an 
additional quantity of foreign exchange to pay for it; whereas long run capital is paid for slowly”(RP Vol. III, p. 329). 






For Prebisch, the bust (downward phase) was a ‘natural’ and unavoidable 
sequence of the boom (expansionary phase). And in this sense the point of 
inflection from boom (expansion) to bust (contraction) was bound to 
occur. Moreover, the depth of the latter maintained a direct relationship 
with the intensity of the former. The greater the excesses of the boom 
(expansion) the more drastic would be the bust (contraction). At the same 
time, the bust (contraction) was not only unavoidable, but in fact 
necessary to prepare the stage for the next upward phase. 
Coherently with this view, until Prebisch became convinced that a 
central monetary authority possessed the instrumental to attenuate the 
cycle phases (see section below on Money, the Cycle and Economic 
Policy), he thought that attempts to avoid the contractionary phase of the 
cycle (and more specifically a bust) could only have temporary effects and 
were in fact ultimately useless to a necessary process required to restore 
external equilibrium; a VLQH TXD QRQ condition for internal equilibrium. 
Moreover, by postponing what is viewed as a natural process, these 
measures are ultimately seen as artifices, which tend to aggravate the 
required correcting forces. Two illustrative examples are provided by the 
reactions to the busts in the 1867-1875 and 1881-1885 cycles. 
In the 1867-1875 cycle, the government tried to avoid the bust 
phase by resorting to intervention in the foreign exchange market, 
maintaining the stability of the rate of discount or prime rate, the partial 
financial rescue of speculators, and the increase in the paper money 
supply to offset  the decline  in  specie  availability. Yet this only 
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aggravated the situation as illustrated by the fact that the number of bad loans increased $343 
thousand to $4.3 million between 1873 and 1876. Prebisch describes the process in the following way 
(RP. Vol. I, p. 122): 
“The Office of changes witnessed the rapid diminution of its metallic reserves, since the peso holders 
solicited their conversion into gold…the office was able to face the conversion needs thanks to the 
efforts of its board of directors and to the cooperation of banks in particular which facilitated large sums 
[of gold]…but there came a moment in time when missing …the obligations of the country had to be 
met in gold. In this way all measures had an ephemeral effect…in the face of the reduction in metallic 
reserves, non-conversion was an inevitable corollary. The government decreed it on the 16 of May 
1876.” 
During the 1881-1885 cycle, faced with similar factors to those that ended the convertibility 
experiment of 1867, the Argentinean government tried to avoid the bust by suspending specie payments 
and maintaining a false sense of prosperity mediated by the issue of paper money and lasting until 1890. 
For him: 
“…if the payments in metallic had not been suspended in 1885…a great part of the gold would have 
left the country to restore the equilibrium in the balance of payments, the quantity of money…(would 
have) suffered a brisk contraction and determined the liquidation of business and of the speculative 
activities and the decline in prices and real estate values...However,…the government declared the 
inconvertibility. With which the deflation of the currency which was its logical and sane consequence 
did not occur….the causes of the disequilibrium would continue acting with increased intensity 
preparing a stronger outcome than the one avoided with palliatives” (RP Vol. I, p. 141). 
The turning point and triggering factor of the bust (contraction) for Prebisch is the same for all 
cycles considered, namely an unsustainable external position and more precisely an unsustainable 
current account deficit. This position is brought about by a combination of rising imports and/or higher 
service debt obligations and/or lower financial flows. The weight attributed to each of these factors 
depends on the specific cycle under consideration. 
As with his analysis of the initiating factors of the cycle, Prebisch was aware and understood the 
importance of external conditions in influencing the change from boom (expansion) to bust 
(contraction), and in particular that of international financial markets.30 Eventually Prebisch gave 
paramount importance to external conditions and argued in 1944 that the Argentine cycle is a mirror of 
the international monetary cycle (RP, Vol. III, pp. 321-322).  Nonetheless until that time he argued that 
the adequate management of internal conditions especially prudence in the conduct of economic policy 
during the boom (expansion), could substantially attenuate the impact on domestic activity of external 
‘shocks‘31. 
At a general level in the first two cycles (1867-1873 and 1881-1883) the weight of the explanation of 
the inflection from boom (expansion) to bust (contraction) is placed on the rise in imports that is on a ‘real 
side variable.’ A minor role is attributed to rising debt services obligations coupled with a reduction in 
financial inflows (RP, Vol. I. pp. 120 and 142) that is, to ‘financial variables.’ 
                                                        
30  Curiously enough while Prebisch recognized the importance of external conditions in the initiation of the cycle he did not always 
attribute the same significance to their role in the bust. As an example, when analyzing the factors that led to the bust (contraction) in 
the 1867-1876 cycle he states (Vol. I, pp. 199-120), “A greater part of the gold had been exported in payment of public debts, 
dividends of firms with foreign capital… etc.; in other words the liabilities of the loan balance grew. It also not unsafe to say, that the 
asset side of this balance declined due to the tension in the European monetary markets in 1873, consequent upon the continental 
panic begun in Vienna; tension that must have made difficult the recruitment of new loans in the financial market of Europe.” 
31  In this regard he writes (RP, Vol. I., p. 554): “…if we had administered prudently the increase in metallic reserves, the export of gold 
provoked by high foreign interest rates, caused only a mild recess in the prosperity of our commerce. But if it were employed 
generously in the expansion of money and credit without forestalling speculative excesses, the outflows of gold precipitated the 
outcome of a more or less severe crisis.” 
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As shown in table 3 above (which provides data for exports, imports, the trade balance, debt 
service, current account, capital account and the overall balance-of-payments result) at the start of the 
Prebisch cycles, two years after the beginning of each cycle and finally for the peak years of the 
respective cycles using his sources), imports tend to increase after the start of the cycle. 
As a result of the rise in imports the trade imbalance expands between the start and peak of the cycle. 
The trade imbalance reached -4.2 million gold pesos at the beginning of the second cycle and widens by a 
fifth-fold to reach 26 million gold pesos at the peak. In the case of the third cycle an initial trade surplus 
worth 2 million gold pesos in 1881 turns into a deficit equivalent to -26 gold pesos in 1884. 
In his explanation, Prebisch hardly mentions the behavior of exports as a contributing factor to the 
trade imbalance. While this is justified in the 1881-1885 cycle as the growing import (mainly consumer 
goods and raw materials) needs surpassed the expansion of exports; the growing external deficit in the 
cycle 1867-1875 can be attributed in part to poor export performance (see Figure 3 below). 
Between the start of the Caisse in 1867 and during the next four years until 1871, the most notable 
fact explaining the deficit in the trade balance is not so much the increase in imports which were not above 
their trend during this time, but rather the significant drop in exports. Between 1867 and 1871 exports 
declined by 23% in value terms due to part a drop in export prices, competition for Argentinean exports 
from New Zealand and Australia and the end of the Civil War in the United States.32 
Contrarily to the first two cycles analyzed by Prebisch, financial factors become a paramount 
explanatory variable in the turning points of the next three cycles (1886-1890; 1903-1914, 1927-1933). More 
precisely the bust in the 1886-1890 cycle is attributed fundamentally to a violent contraction in external loans 
(RP, Vol. I, pp. 155-156). For its part the turning point in the 1903-1914 episode, is explained by a 
combination of lower inflows and higher debt service obligations.  Finally terms-of-trade, external demand 
conditions, and in particular financial factors, explain the inflection point in the 1927-1933 (RP, Vol. I, pp. 












                                                        
32  Newland (1998, Table 2, p. 412) gives an estimate export drop of -19% on average between 1861-1865 and 1866-1871. He also 
provides evidence for a rise in import prices (8% between the same periods). As a result the terms of trade declined by 17%. 
Panettieri, 1980, p. 396, provides evidence along similar lines for wool exports showing a -16% reduction between 1867/1868 and 
1869/1870. 
33  In the 1927-1928 cycle, other items such as remittances of Argentina to the rest of the world and travel expenses also contributed to 
widen the external imbalance. The external accounts for the first three cycles (1867-1875; 1881-1890 and 1899-1913) are presented 
in terms of exports and new loans (on the credit side); imports and loan services (on the debit side).  By the time Prebisch analyzed 
the 1927-1929 cycle he possessed a wider set of data at his disposal and was able to provide a more sophisticated presentation of the 
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In consonance with his understanding that the boom (expansion) and bust 
(contraction) are symmetric phases of the realization of same process, 
Prebisch argued that the same forces pushing economic activity in the 
boom (expansion) would act in the opposite direction in the bust 
(contraction). His transmission mechanism followed the lines dictated by 
the monetary theories of the trade cycle and the quantity theory of money, 
placing changes in the flow of money and their effect on activity, prices 
and imports at the center stage of his explanation.34 
The increase in financial flows or the rise of exports above import 
demand due to an increase in external demand, a rise in export prices or a 
combination of both translates into an excess supply of foreign exchange. 
Banks expand their lending base due to the acquisition of letters of credits 
from exporters, which leads to an increase in deposits and thus loans, and 
also as a result of the increase in the stock of metallic currency. The 
consequent increase in liquidity leads eventually to an increase in imports 
(RP, Vol. II, p. 648; Vol. III, pp. 249-250; pp. 320-329). 
 
                                                        
34  See, Hawtrey ([1919], 1950) and Taussig ([1911] 1915, 1917, 1927).  
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In his analysis of the cycles prior to the Great Depression, the rise in imports responded to the 
increase in prices and the improvement in business conditions concomitant upon the expansion of 
liquidity. As he put it in the case the 1905-1914 cycle, which exemplifies his views on the transmission 
mechanism at this, stage (RP, Vol. I, p. 168): 
“…through the foreign exchange market, are produced the inflows and outflows of metallic 
currency, that influence on the quantity of money and through this one on  prices and  business 
conditions; these two factors react in turn on the balance of payments. It is in this way that…the 
swelling of imports has found its direct and indirect stimulus through the level of prices and the 
times of boom brought about by the expansion of the circulating media.” 
Following the Great Depression rather than emphasizing price effects in the relationship between 
the increase in liquidity, prices and imports as in his earlier interpretation of the cycle, he centers on 
income effects, arguing that imports increase because: “a considerable part of the direct consumption in 
the country, or machinery or materials for its industries, comes from abroad” (RP, Vol. II p. 74) and 
(Ibid. p. 648) “the positive balance in the international accounts is manifest in a dilation of the means of 
payments…the general demand for goods and services increases; and imports, which in our country are 
very sensitive, will feel rapidly the pinch.”35 
As a result of the rise in imports, the widening of the external imbalance led inevitably to the 
export of gold (specie), and a contraction in liquidity leading to deflation and liquidation. As argued 
above, Prebisch sees this bust (contraction) phase as a logical consequence of the ‘exorbitant increase in 
money supply,’ which accompanies the boom (expansion) phase of the business cycle. 
More to the point he conceived this phase as symmetrical to the boom (expansionary) phase. The 
same factors that propped up the economy on its upward phase pull down the economy in the downward 
phase. As he put it with regard to the second boom-bust cycle (RP, Vol. I. p.120): 
“And just as the abundance in capital brought about easy and cheap credit, so did its scarcity, as 
soon as they began to be removed from circulation, made credit more difficult to obtain and 
increased the rate of interest…And there began….a descending period characterized by credit 
restriction, liquidation and business depression…the trade malaise intensified …real estate 
speculation, bereft of easy and abundant credit began its involution…” 
A similar statement is found in his analysis of the 1927-1928 cycle (RP, Vol. I p. 583):  “the 
decline in metallic stock engenders a series of perturbations which are characteristic of the descending 
phase of the monetary cycle initiated when gold flowed to our country. And those factors that promote this 
development are precisely the opposite of those that intervened in the preceding ascending phase.”36 
Initially at this stage he labeled the effects of the bust (contraction) as natural and healthy, and as 
a cleansing of the bad elements as did some of the prominent economists of the same as for example 
Schumpeter (e.g. RP, Vol. II, p. 601 and footnote 38 below), A similar account permeates his analysis of 
the bust (contraction) in the case of the 1905-1914 cycle. As he put it (RP, Vol. I, p.171): “With the 
beginning of the first outflows of metallic currency and consequently of the rarefaction of money [bills] 
in circulation, lack of confidence abounds and banks restrain their credit. The more imprudent is the 
previous policy the more intense will the restriction….” This monetary reaction is particularly harsh on 
speculators and those that has abused of the easiness of credit conditions. Furthermore while, it affected 
‘true and sane’ businesses, these managed to weather the storm and remain in business. All in all, this 
was according to Prebisch the logical reverse, a natural and sane reaction to a previous false and 
artificial prosperity. 
                                                        
35  Prebisch (RP, Vol. II, pp. 648-649) provides an example of an increase of 300 million pesos in income of which 80% and 20% 
respectively are spent on domestic and foreign goods.  Simple computations show that after 30 periods the expenditure on domestic 
goods equals 1,199 millions and that on imported goods reaches 300 million (that is the amount of the increase in income). The 
multiplier in Prebisch’s example is 3.99. 
36  See also RP Vol. III, p.232. 
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However, eventually he came to recognize the painful and protracted effects of adjustment and 
deflation on economic activity. 37 This resulted to a great extent from the existence of imperfections and 
in particular contracts fixed in money terms, rigid and fixed costs such as wages and in general 
production costs. As well deflation swelled the debt burden (Vol. I., pp. 59-60 also p. 135). These 
arguments formed the basis on which to question the beneficial of ‘liquidation’ during the downward 
phase of the cycle. In this regard it is useful to quote Prebisch at length (RP, Vol. II, pp. 47-48):
“A well known economic theory, of orthodox lineage, teaches, in effect, that situations of this 
nature, in times of crisis, are solved through liquidation. The theory is perfectly exact judged on the 
hypothesis on which it is based. It assumes the case of a state of production which due to credit 
facilities has exceeded the consumption capacity of the market or the fictitious valorisation of real 
estate property…sooner or later the market cannot absorb these goods or values at the prevailing 
prices…sales are paralyzed…The same theory provides the recipe: restrict credit and force 
liquidation…With liquidation banks recover their funds…the situation is cleared, through losses and 
bankruptcies, but the evil disappears…The inept are evicted and only the most gifted survive by 
selection. The most superficial reflection suffices to persuade that that theory of liquidation 
corresponds to factual data that are very distinct from the reality of Argentina.”38 
The relationship between liquidity and prices and economic expansion and imports in the boom 
(upward phase) and the bust (downward phase) was mediated, not only the capacity of the banking 
system to expand and retract its credit base, but also the behavior of the circulation velocity of money 
and the propensity to import. The circulation velocity of money was partly driven by expectations 
encapsulated in what Prebisch termed ‘the subjective factors’. 
In his own word these included in the case of the boom (expansionary phase): ‘the appreciation of 
the opportunities offered by Argentina and of the probabilities of rapid enrichment…stimulated the 
governing class…to contract European money…It’s something subjective the confidence 
which…permits and accelerates the development of an ascending phase; thanks to it [confidence] 
businesses expand on the basis of credit and financial fantasy takes its flight’. In the bust (downward 
phase) during which the contraction in credit produces the collapse of economic activity, ‘the insecurity, 
depression and mistrust maintain businesses stagnant, until the remembrance of tragic epochs becomes 
blurred and reborn confidence opens the way for a new cycle (RP, Vol, I, p. 161-162).39 
As Prebisch became more concerned with the balance of trade and more precisely exports as an 
initiating factor of the cycle, the analysis of the transmission mechanism focused in more detail on the 
linkage and pass through between exports and imports.  He argued that exports and imports ‘vary 
correlatively,’ that is a persistent upwards/downward movement in either imports (exports) tends to be 
accompanied by a movement in the same direction of exports (imports). Credit conditions, the 
circulation velocity of money and the propensity to import determined the pass-through (RP, Vol. III. 
pp. 336-343). 
                                                        
37  The negative effects of deflation were also highlighted by Silvio Gesell (1862-1930), a German economist who resided in Argentina 
from 1886 to 1900. Referring to the specific period of the end of the 19th Century in Argentina, Gesell stated: “..The increase in the 
value of money is the common cause for all the country’s economic troubles” (La Anemia Monetaria, 1898).  Keynes in his Tract on 
Monetary Reform ([1923], 1971) also pointed out the negative effects of deflation. Finally it is to be noted that these were 
highlighted by the early Chicago School of economics in terms similar to those of Prebisch at this stage of his thinking (that is in 
terms of nominal price and wage rigidities) and became the basis to recommend reflationary policies (e.g. Simons ([1934], (1962), p. 
55). 
38  See also the “Scholastic Inflation and Argentinean Currency” (1934, RP, Vol. II, pp. 336-350 and Vol. III, p. 348. ‘Liquidation’ was 
one the phases of the cycle identified by Juglar (1860) and became associated with the Austrian Theory of the business cycle (see for 
example Schumpeter ([1939], 1989, Hayek 1933) and with passive policies adopted by the Federal Reserve and the Edgar Hoover 
administration that deepened the Great Depression (See White, 2010 for a contrary opinion). Eichengreen (1999, pp. 8, 12) defines it 
as: “… liquidationism, according to which business cycle downturns served the Darwinian function of weeding out the weak 
enterprises least well adapted to a dynamic economy.” As can be seen Prebisch understood liquidation and its effect in a very modern 
sense. 
39  Prebisch’s depiction bears resemblance to Kindleberger’s ([1978], 2005) cycle of manias and panics which is triggered by ‘pro-
cyclical changes in the supply of credit’ leading to a boom (expansion) and a process of euphoria, overtrading, and speculation 
(manias). Eventually, there follow a period of financial distress, revulsion, panic and crash. Both Prebisch and Kindleberger 
emphasize the recurring character of manias and panics. 
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As with his earlier cycle views he still recognizes that the budget deficit contributes to the 
expansion of liquidity and the increase in imports in the economy. However, in contrast to his previews 
views, the public deficit plays a role towards the end of the phase of expansion. The intervention of the 
public authorities prolongs the duration of the boom (expansionary phase), mitigates the impact of the 
decline in capital flows which occurs near the peak of the expansive phase partly offsetting the 
consequent contraction in liquidity and delaying the adjustment of imports to the new existing 
conditions (RP, Vol. II, pp.74-76).  






Prebisch further developed his analysis of the pass-through between 
export receipts, domestic activity and imports by introducing a concept in 
(FLUFD 1935) termed the ‘coefficient of expansion’ (RP, Vol. III, pp. 249-
298; 301-310; 335-342; 349-370).40 It measured the intensity with which 
an increment in incomes, resulting from a given increase in exports or 
financial flows, produces an expansion of greater amplitude in domestic 
economic activity. 
Beginning with a position of equilibrium, he explains the workings 
of a one-time increase in exports in the following way (RP, Vol. III, p. 
250):  
“If for example, the volume of Argentinean exports increase –either 
due to an increase in exports or to the rise in prices- the agricultural sector 
will receive incomes correlatively higher allowing it to increase its demand 
for goods and services produced by other sectors and also for imported goods. 
There will be a higher demand for industrial goods; more commerce activity 
and in transportation; greater utilization of professional services and greater 
imports. At the same time, these sectors, that will have received more 
incomes will increase their demands for goods and services produced within 
the same sector and of other sectors and in this way will the influence or the 
effect of the initial growth in income of the agricultural sector produced by 
the increase in its exports successively expand.”   
                                                        
40  See also Fernández-López (1996). 
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Eventually the system will return to equilibrium when the rise in domestic incomes brought about 
by the expansion in exports leaks out through a greater volume of imports and other payments through 
the rest of the world. 
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 below show an illustration of Prebisch’s coefficient of expansion on the basis 
of the full treatment provided in 1944 (ibid, pp.257 and 264-265).  The example considers the income 
(columns) and expenditure (rows) of three sectors (agriculture, industry and non-tradables). In the 
example below, as a case in point, the agricultural sector earns 1,260, 730, 280 and 340 monetary units 
from exports and the non-tradable, industrial and agricultural sectors respectively. It spends 340, 590 
and 1,270 monetary units on domestic products and services of agriculture, industry and non-tradables. 
It also spends 400 monetary units on imports. The agricultural sector is the most dependent on export 
earnings (49% of the total) with a roughly average propensity to import. 
The initial situation is one of full equilibrium with expenditure equal to income and, as expected, 
exports equal imports. In the example given by Prebisch, this initial situation is disturbed by a shock in 
the form of a one-time exogenous increase in exports of the agricultural sector by 1,000 monetary units. 
The resulting increase in the income of that sector is spent in other sectors according to the initial given 
proportions. That is, in the case of agriculture for example, 13%, 23%, 49% and 15% of the increase in 
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Eventually, successive rounds of spending lead to a situation where the cumulative expenditure in 
imports equals exactly the initial increase in exports (1,339 monetary units) (See Table 6 below).  This 
occurs in the specific example provided by Prebisch after roughly 60 periods. At this point this three-
sector economy returns to new position of equilibrium, where total exports equal total imports (3,339 
monetary units) and income equals expenditure (22,910 monetary units) (see Table 7 below). The 
ultimate impact on total and domestic expenditure is 6 and 5 times the initial increase in exports. 
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As can be deduced from this example the effect of the coefficient of expansion is limited on the 
one hand by the propensity to import which correspond to the leakages in the simple foreign trade 
multiplier analysis. (‘the quantity of money lost in each trade for import payment’). In this example it is 
equal to roughly 0.17 on average for the three sectors (15%, 20% and 16% for agriculture, industry and 
non-tradables respectively). A simple simulation exercise doubling the import propensity from 0.17 to 
0.34 on average results in a commensurate decrease in the level expenditure (equal income) by 50% 
(from 7,865 to 3,960  monetary units). 
The other limiting factor Prebisch identified is the circulation velocity of money (‘the number of 
times money changes hands’). The fact that the effectiveness and potency of the coefficient of expansion 
was limited by the propensity to import and the circulation velocity of money led him to distinguish his 
‘coefficient of expansion’ from Keynes’ ‘multiplier’ as set out in the GT.41 
Prebisch, saw the multiplier effect as being explained by Keynes only for a closed economy with 
marginal references to the import propensity, with no reference to the circulation velocity of money and 
limited mainly in its effects by the savings propensity, “which constrains the expansion of economic 
activity and conspires against the full employment of resources” (RP, Vol. III, p. 359). 
                                                        
41  John Maurice Clark also emphasized the importance of monetary circulation for the working of the multiplier process (Fiorito and 
Vernengo, 2009). 























In the GT, Keynes was mainly concerned with an entrepreneur economy and with the process of 
decision making under uncertainty. In this sense the multiplier analysis appears in fact in a superficial 
and perhaps incomplete form (e.g. Khan (1984, p. 134); Chick (1997, pp.162-184)). Nonetheless, he was 
well aware of the effects of the propensity to import on the multiplier as illustrated by the reasoning 
underlying his estimate of Britain’s multiplier and the comparison to that of the United States (GT, 
pp.121-122).42 
This follows from the fact that the propensity to import was part of the framework and indeed 
logic with which the multiplier was conceived (Khan, 1931 and 1933). Imports along with savings and 
‘the non-transfer portion of the income of the unemployed’, was considered a leakage, and leakages 
ensured that the multiplier could be expressed as an infinite but converging geometrical series. 
Accordingly Keynes’ ‘Means to Prosperity’ (1933) published three years prior to the GT which deals 
with an open economy, fully incorporates the propensity to import as part of the multiplier analysis 
presented. Moreover, by that time, treatments of the foreign trade multiplier could be found in Giblin 
(1930), Warming (1932), Kalecki (1933), and Harrod (1933) (which was fully incorporated into 
Keynes’ theory of effective demand by 1939). 43 By 1941, roughly three years prior to Prebisch’s full 
treatment of the export expansion coefficient, the foreign trade multiplier was a well-established concept 
in the literature (Haberler, 1952). 
Note that in the example provided by Prebisch above, as in others provided by him, incomes are 
eventually fully spent domestically or externally through imports. As a result, the propensity to save (s) 
ultimately tends to zero and the effect of a change of exports (X) on expenditure (Y) is reduced to the 
inverse of the marginal propensity to import (m) or to the foreign trade multiplier. Hence, the increase in 
income is thus determined by the rise in exports times the foreign trade multiplier. Formally: 
(1)   k = 1/(1-c+m) Ù 1/(s+m); given s=0 => k= 1/m  
Where, 
k = multiplier. 
                                                        
42  Keynes writings denote an important concern with the external sector and in fact in the GT he argued that the lack of concern with 
the external position of a country was a by-product of laissez-faire. As he put it (GT, p. 339): “…the weight of my criticism is direct 
against the inadequacy of the theoretical foundations of the laissez-faire doctrine upon which I was brought up... against the notion 
that the rate of interest and the volume of investment are self-adjusting at the optimum level, so that preoccupation with the balance 
of trade is a waste of time” (GT, p.339). 
43  See, King (1998). Harberler ((1941) [1952]) traces the marginal propensity to import to Paish (1914).  
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c = marginal propensity to consume. 
The use of eq. (1) to determine the increase in income brought about by an autonomous change in 
exports yields,  
(2) ǻY= 1/m ǻX Ù (ǻY/ ǻX ) = 1/m  
In the example provided by Prebisch presented in tables 5-7 above, m=0.17, ǻX =1,339 and 
ǻY=7,871, or in other words, 
(3) ǻY=7,871=1/m ǻX=(1/0.17)*1,339)44 
As mentioned above, besides the propensity to import, Prebisch identified the circulation velocity 
of money as the other key variable absent from Keynes’ GT multiplier analysis allowing him to draw a 
distinction between his approach and that of Keynes. Prior to the publication of the GT, J.M. Clark 
(1935a) had made the distinction between (p.16): “…two approaches, one via successive cycles of 
income and spending by ultimate recipients of income, the other via the volume of money and its 
velocity of circulation. The first has been…developed by…Kahn…and J.M. Keynes; the second has, so 
far as I am aware, not found its way into print.” 
Following upon, J.M. Clark’s distinction, some authors have argued that the logic of the 
multiplier implicitly includes assumptions regarding the behavior of the circulation velocity of money 
and that the analysis is incomplete without its explicit incorporation into the analysis. Haberler ([1937], 
1952, p. 232) pointed out that to determine the secondary effects of new public expenditure, information 
was needed about the marginal propensity to consume and the circulation velocity of money. Machlup 
(1939) argued that the time element is ‘of great importance’ to the theory of the multiplier and 
introduced period analysis to work out the primary and secondary effects of public works spending, 
where periods are seen as reciprocals of the circulation velocity of money. Prebisch seems to hold a 
similar view as he argues (RP Vol. III, p. 359) that following an increase in income primary employment 
will expand but that this will not give to an expansion in secondary increased employment unless there 
is another round of new expenditure or unless the circulation velocity of money increases. 
However, the reconciliation of both approaches is problematic.45 The circulation velocity of 
money is a purely expenditure approach emphasizing only aggregate demand and exchange. As part of 
the quantity theory framework and a central component of monetary cycle theories, it assumes full 
employment and thus postulates that supply correctly anticipates demand. This view negates the 
production side of the multiplier, an important part of Keynes’ approach, as well as the role played by 
uncertainty in his theory. 
                                                        
44  See, Fernández-López (1996). Thirlwall and McCombie (1994) have revived Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier in the current 
literature dynamically as a growth theory, and more precisely as a Balance-of-Payments-Constraint (BPC) approach to growth. 
Putting aside the static versus dynamic differences in Prebisch and Thirlwall their approach is very similar. In both cases the level or 
growth of output determined is consistent with balance-of-payments (trade) equilibrium. Prebisch’s derivation can easily be made 
‘dynamic’ and turned into a BPC growth theory simply by assuming ‘normal multiplicative’ import and export demand functions as 
in Thirlwall and McCombie (ibid) and this would not alter in any way his reasoning. 
45  See, Clark (1935a; 1935b), and the correspondence between Clark and Hansen (1934) and Clark and Samuelson (1953) reproduced 
in Fiorito (2001). Also see Archibald (1956) and Lutz (1955). 







For the most part until 1931, the action of the government and the 
monetary and financial system during the upswings and downswings of 
the Argentine economic cycle had been pro-cyclical. This stance was 
easily justifiable since the business cycle was a ‘natural’, recurrent and 
predictable phenomenon with inevitable symmetrical upward and 
downward phases. Moreover as emphasized in an earlier section, avoiding 
downturns through artificial made the adjustment harsher. 
The first policy reactions to the Great Depression did not constitute 
an exception. On the monetary front, the prevailing ideas, including those 
of Prebisch at the time, argued in favour of undertaking severe 
stabilization and adjustment measures to put the country, which in spite of 
its contractionary effects in the short run, on a ready stand to take 
advantage of the inevitable up-coming recovery. On the fiscal front a 
similar logic dictated the reduction of public salaries and State 
expenditures and the paralysis of public works (RP, Vol. IV, p. 116-
117).46  Moreover, the greater were the excesses during the upswing of 
the business cycle, the more intense was the contraction in the downward 
phase of the cycle. 
Since the cycle was bound to occur, the role of policy was limited 
and could at most ensure the orderly occurrence of its phases. On the one 
hand, policy could avoid the excesses of the boom (upward  
 
                                                        
46  As Under Secretary of Finance, Prebisch implemented what he himself termed ‘brutal budget adjustments’ including a 15% reduction 
in government wages. See, Pollock et al. (2002, p. 543). 
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phase) including the characteristic processes of speculation and over-indebtedness, since the greater the 
excesses of the boom (in the upward phase) the harsher would be the following inevitable contraction. 
On the other hand, it could mitigate the effects of the downward phase on business conditions and real 
activity.47  
A necessary condition to allow policy to play this role was the abandonment of the Gold 
Standard, which tended to aggravate the amplitude of the phases of the cycle making it more unstable. 
Prebisch identified three key weaknesses of the Gold Standard. First, its workings required the 
unnecessary contraction of imports at the same time as that of internal activities. Second, the natural 
trend for banks was to increase their lending in the ascending phase of the cycle contributing to 
exaggerate the amplitude of the boom (expansionary) phase and the contraction in the downward phase. 
Third, that the stability of the exchange rates under a gold standard regime contributed to stimulate 
quick silver capital inflows aggravating the phases of the economic cycle (RP, Vol. III, pp. 233-242; 
Vol. II, pp. 565-575; Vol. IV, p.141). Linked to these criticisms, was the argument that metallic 
currency regimes such as the Conversion Caisse were ‘fair weather boards,’ giving an appearance of 
smooth functioning in good times as capital flowed yet requiring in fact violent deflations in bad times 
when capital flowed out (RP, Vol. III, p.4 and Vol. I). 
The abandonment of the Gold Standard in Argentina in 1929, introduced the possibility of 
tinkering with discretionary policy measures to smooth out the fluctuations of the economic cycle. 
However, these measures did not have their intended consequences as these increased the instability and 
flimsy foundations of the current conditions. It would become obvious that managing, to the extent of 
the possible, the fluctuations of the economic cycle required a strong, central and independent monetary 
authority. 
At first to avoid the depreciation of the currency the government decided to export significant 
quantities of gold, reducing its supply thus raising the foreign exchange price of the currency. The 
consequent effect of the reduction of domestic gold supply on money supply, credit and in general liquidity 
conditions forced the introduction of the rediscount (RP, Vol. III, p. 4 and p.89; Vol. IV. p. 138). 
The idea of using the rediscount was actually devised but not implemented in 1914 (RP, Vol. I, p. 
173). In April 1931 Prebisch suggested its use with the aim of resorting banks liquidity to pursue their 
day-to-day operations and confront their immediate obligations avoiding the recourse to a brisk credit 
contraction and avoid a financial crash. The rediscount was not created to be used to stimulate new 
business or expand new ones and certainly not to spur or facilitate long term-investment (RP, Vol. II, p. 
2., Vol. III, p.89 and Vol. IV, pp. 118-119). 
The use of the rediscount was followed by the imposition of exchange controls to countenance 
fears of further exchange rate depreciation due to Great Britain’s departure from the Gold Standard 
regime in October 1931(RP Vol. II, pp. 4-6). The imposition of exchange controls lasted from October 
1931 until towards the end of 1933 and fixed the value of the peso at an artificially high value. The 
consequences were to further the external imbalance and the decline in agriculture and industrial prices 
thus aggravating the effects of the Great Depression including that of growing unemployment and 
expanding debt. The measures also provided the incentives for the creation of a foreign exchange black 
market (RP, Vol. III pp.16-17). 
Eventually the pernicious unintended effects of these measures led to a change in the monetary 
stance in 1933 consisting of a combination of exchange rate devaluation coupled with the establishment 
of a dual exchange rate system consisting  of an official (affecting the export of traditional products) and 
                                                        
47  This type of measures should be distinguished from those aimed at prolonging in an unnecessary fashion the boom (expansion). See, 
RP, Vol. I. p.123. 
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market based exchange rate and the imposition of import permits (See table A-1 in the annex for a more 
detailed description of these measures).48 
Prebisch would later sustain that foreign exchange and import controls had been successful in 
helping to restore the external equilibrium in 1933. He passed a similar judgment on similar measures 
applied in 1937, and in period running from 1938 to 1940 also stating that these measures provided a 
way to stimulate domestic industry (RP, Vol. IV. p.194). Probably this experience coupled with the 
analysis of the foreign trade multiplier (see Eq.(2) above) constituted important steps leading towards 
his proposal of  reducing the ‘import coefficient’ as one of key pillars of his later policy proposal to 
achieve ‘general economic growth’ (ibid, Vol. IV pp.207-215). 
Prebisch argued that the use of discretionary measures such as the re-discount, notwithstanding 
its lack of success, and exchange controls paved the way for the creation of the Central Bank in 1935, 
although he claims that he had seen the need to create a central monetary authority before WWI. As he 
puts it (RP, Vol. II, p. 7. Note): 
“When I was at the Banco de la Nación as Director of Economic Research I realized that the 
Conversion Caisse did not function, that it functioned when gold flowed in the country and ceased to 
function when gold flowed out of the country, and that a fundamental reform was necessary. This, 
before the great crisis. I began to roam in my head the idea of the creation of an Argentine Central 
Bank. When the crisis came it was necessary to take emergency measures, and that convinced me 
even more that a Central Bank was necessary; that the rediscount could not be applied, without a 
previous organization; that it was necessary to articulate that with a series of other instruments, and 
that was the Central Bank.”    
The Central Bank of Argentina saw the light in 1935. The project for the bank was drafted by 
Prebisch himself in 1934 at the request of the minister of finance Federico Pinedo.49 It was conceived as 
an institution independent of the government (‘It is not conceivable that a Central Bank be managed by 
governments’)50 permitting a more rational distribution of monetary functions and more efficient 
management of reserves, whose main objective was monetary stability, along conventional lines. 
To this end, Prebisch thought that the Central Bank had a role to play in cushioning the effects of 
the economic cycles although he found illusory to think that it could offset the movements of the cycle. 
As he put it: (RP, Vol. II, p. 64) “To expect that ondulatory movements in the economic activity of the 
country can be offset by the excellence of a monetary system would be to fall in the same illusion 
harbored by many economists of the United States with respect to the Federal Reserve, prior…to 
the…collapse. But it cannot be doubted that the amplitude of those movements could be cushioned by 
an efficiently run Central Bank.”51 
It is important to understand that the cushioning of the fluctuations of the business cycle did not 
respond to the objective of maintaining domestic output stability but rather to that of maintaining the 
stability of prices and that of money. It is in this sense that the lean-against the wind monetary policy 
was in essence of an orthodox nature (see, RP, Vol. III, p. 90). 
                                                        
48  During this time also are seen from Prebisch’s views the first attempts, although tepid and temporary, at countercyclical policy. These 
consisted in sustaining the price of agricultural goods through government purchases, and the undertaken of public works. No doubt 
the influence of J.M. Keynes’ Means to Prosperity, which Prebisch had read in 1993 was paramount in the design of these measures 
(RP, Vol. II, p. 146, Note). In his interview with Prebisch in 1983, Julio González del Solar (apud Mallorquin, 2006) terms the use of 
the rediscount and the creation of the Commission for Foreign Exchange Control in 1931 the first two heterodox steps in Prebisch’s 
thinking. However, as explained above the rediscount was an old idea and Prebisch himself considered it an orthodox instrument. He 
viewed exchange controls as somewhat of a departure from the mainstream doctrine (RP, Vol. III, p. 89). See also, Prebisch (1984, 
p.175). Curiously later on in 1946, he claimed to be in disagreement and ‘abominate’ restrictions including exchange rate controls but 
justified their use on the grounds that developing countries did not possess alternative instruments to confront and mitigate the effects 
of the business cycle (See, RP, Vol. IV., p. 226). 
49  He had been bestowed the same task earlier in 1931 by the then minister of finance Enrique Uriburu. See, RP, Vol. II. Notes to pp. 7 
and 351. 
50  The independence of the Central Banks was seen by Prebisch as a protection against the temptation to inflate the currency due to 
fiscal imbalances (RP Vol. II, p. 363). 
51  See also ibid. p.358 for a similar statement and p. 664-665. 
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The lean against the wind monetary policy was reflected in one of the key objectives of the Central 
Bank as set out in Prebisch’s 1934 project was to ensure an adequate level of reserve accumulation as a 
precautionary motive of building buffer stocks to confront export shocks and sudden capital stops. As he 
put it (RP, Vol. II, p. 610-111): “The ascending movements are, in general, of a limited duration. The 
opportunity to repair the consequences of past wrongs and accumulate reserves for difficult times, whose 
return it is prudent to foresee, should not be then undermined.” 
As such, the first article of project proposal for the creation of a Central Bank in Argentina 
dealing with its functions stated: (ibid, p. 383) “The Bank will have as objective: a) The concentration of 
sufficient reserves to moderate the consequences of fluctuations in exports and the investments of 
foreign capital, on money, credit, commercial activities, in order to maintain the value of money.”52 
Following the creation of the Central Bank, the Argentine economy experienced an expansion in 
economic activity lasting until 1937. During this time the Central Bank, in line with the orthodox spirit 
of its creation, used open-market operations, interventions in the foreign exchange market and moral 
suasion to avoid an over expansion and overheat of the economy (See, ibid, p.64 and 359, pp. 610-622; 
RP, Vol. III, pp. 88-119). 
However, the force of events prompted by the beginning of the downward phase of the cycle in 
1937, led the bank to progressively evolve into a less orthodox institution whose goal became more 
ambitious than just ‘cushioning’ the phases of the business cycle to ensure their orderly occurrence and 
maintain the stability of money. The Central Bank became aware that it had a double objective, price 
and output stability, and that the balance of payments was central for both. 
Initially in 1937, “the Central Bank…was predisposed to consider this contraction of domestic 
economic activity as a logical and natural event, indispensable to reduce imports and establish the 
equilibrium in the balance of payments” (RP Vol. III, pp.101-102). Yet, as the contractionary effects 
wrecked havoc, the Central Bank decided to change and stabilize domestic activity. According to the 
1938 Central Bank Report (RP, Vol. III, p. 104): 
“… monetary policy can propose two objectives in the face of the economic cycle. The first consists 
in avoiding that the expansion of credit accentuates the intensity of ondulatory movement… The 
second objective goes further. It is not limited to avoid the aggravation of these fluctuations, but it 
proposes (se propone) furthermore to limit its amplitude and reduce the intensity of the variation of 
purchasing power during the cycle, in order to attenuate the consequences of its variations on the 
volume of domestic economic activity.” 
The need for countercyclical action resurfaced soon after the start of World War II, as Argentina 
was faced with a growing external imbalance, and the “perception of decline in business activity and in 
particular in the construction sector” leading to a fear of general economic prostration (RP Vol. IV, p. 
156-157). The plan for countercyclical action (The Plan for National Reactivation) contemplated an 
expansionary monetary policy coupled with exchange rate controls. More specifically, the plan sought 
to purchase agricultural surpluses to avoid price declines, increase construction activity and promote the 
finance of industrial development.  
Within the logic of the plan fiscal policy played mainly a supporting role by creating the required 
conditions, incentives and space for private activity to flourish. The details of the plan which also argue 
for the necessity of circumscribing the intervention of the state are reminiscent of the ‘crowding-out’ 
argument highlighting how attached the Argentine authorities remained to orthodox economic thinking. 
The Plan for National Reactivation was never approved. The force of political and external 
events, in particular the war effort of the United States which led to an increase in internal demand and 
                                                        
52  In his International Currency Experience (1944, pp. 85 and 194), Nurske thought highly successful the policy of neutralization, 
mainly international reserve accumulation, pursued by the Argentinean Central Bank. Triffin also entertained a similar opinion 
praising also non-orthodox instruments such as foreign exchange controls. Following a similar line of thought, in 1945, Prebisch 
helped to draft the legislation for the newly created Central Bank of Paraguay and the reform to the existing system of foreign 
exchange controls. See, Helleiner (2009). 
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imports, superseded it. As put by Prebisch (RP Vol. IV. p. 160): “The United States, which in 1940 had 
been absent in the market of certain Argentine products, starts to purchase very actively. This soothes 
our balance of payments concerns, allows a more flexible distribution of foreign exchange, increases 
domestic purchasing power and rapidly changes the context of the situation.” 
The change in external conditions led to the suppression of import permits and the flexibilization 
of the exchange rate regime, even though a dual exchange rate remained in place. It is also important to 
note that in 1943 the central bank imposed capital controls to deter the inflow short-term capital and 
avoid its destabilizing effects and stimulate foreign direct investment. While this measure was in force 
only for three months, it is worth quoting Prebisch at length due to its current relevance (RP Vol. IV, p. 
183): 
“This capital [short-term capital] went to further inflate the categories of goods or assets that were 
already inflated, and did not translate, except in very rare occasions, in a real increase in the 
production of the country… the measures adopted by the government allow to make an exception, to 
allow the inflow of these capitals if it is shown that these are oriented towards the increase in real 
production…”53 
 
                                                        
53  In Latin America, and elsewhere, proponents of capital controls base their case precisely on the argument put forward by Prebisch, 
that is, the change in the composition of financial inflows from short-term to long-term investment. 








Prebisch viewed the change in external conditions after the start of WWII 
and its effects on Argentina as a validation of his business cycle approach. 
The business cycle and its phases was a recurrent and natural 
phenomenon. The phases were related and the more exaggerated was the 
boom (expansionary) phase the sharper would be the contraction. The 
change from boom (expansionary) to bust (contractionary) conditions 
occurred rapidly and unpredictably requiring flexibility in economic 
policy and more importantly moderation and prudence, and an active 
policy of neutralization.54 
While he did recommend avoiding excessive fiscal spending and 
lax monetary policies, and increased savings during the boom (expansion) 
to face and weather the inevitable following contraction he argued that a 
country like Argentina should not be forced to forego higher growth and 
improved material well being during the upward phase of the cycle, only 
to face to consequences of a downturn. 
 
 
                                                        
54  As he explains: “We are exposed, in our country, to rapid and unpredictable changes in the economic situation. We pass in a few 
months of transition from a moment of somber perspectives, such as in 1940, to the opposite situation…It suffices to reflect on what 
would have happened if the plan for construction [under the National Plan for Reactivation] would have been launched and to the 
resulting purchasing power would have been added a new purchasing power derived from the increase in exports: circulation would 
have expanded in an exaggerated manner, with the pernicious consequence that always follow”(Vol. IV, p.160). 
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He ultimately recommended shielding the domestic economy from the ups and downs by a 
process of substitution of domestic industry and production for foreign imports. This was a basis for 
arguing for the promotion and development of domestic industry and the expansion of internal activity. 
These ideas were already embedded in his book proposal 0RQH\DQG(FRQRPLF$FWLYLW\on which 
he began working in 1943, the year in which as a result of a military coup marking the eventual 
ascendancy of Peronism, Prebisch lost the position in the administration, including his Central Bank 
appointment, that had been essential for the development of his ideas since the early 1930s.55 
In 0RQH\DQG(FRQRPLF$FWLYLW\heargued that monetary and financial policy should have three 
main aims: (i) attenuate the incidences of the abrupt changes in harvest conditions and the fluctuations 
and external contingencies; (ii) create the monetary conditions that stimulate the development and 
maintenance of full employment of the working force; (iii) foster and support the highest possible rate of 
growth of economic activity.56 
The successful achievement of these policies required an imports policy and a fiscal reform. The 
imports policy consisted in ‘the rational modification of their composition to serve certain objectives’ 
rather than their systematic restrictions.’ Prebisch thought that a policy of autarky was as absurd as a 
policy of free trade and agreed that Argentina should participate to the extent of the possible in the 
international economy but to avoid a ‘constant subordination of the national economy to external 
movements and contingencies,’ the country needed to ‘develop inwardly, strengthening its internal 
structure and achieve an autonomous functioning of its economy.’57 
Prebisch’s defense of national policy autonomy eventually took on a regional tone, as he became 
convinced that the Argentinean cycle and its features were not specific to Argentina but that they were 
rather the manifestations and characteristics of the workings of a global process, a universal cycle. In 
this sense that Prebisch argued, as mentioned above, that the Argentine cycle was a mirror, a reflection, 
of external of the international monetary cycle. 
The global or universal cycle was triggered by developed countries and more specifically by what 
he termed to be the cyclical center. The cyclical center referred to the country (perhaps group of 
countries) whose economic repercussions due its importance were transmitted to the rest of the world. In 
the nineteenth and up until WWI, Great Britain held the cyclical center title only to be taken by the 
United States thereafter. The countries subject to the influence of the impulses of the center, the 
periphery, included all Latin American countries. As Prebisch put it (RP, Vol. IV, p.224): 
“The United States…fulfils the role of the main cyclical center, not only within the continent but also in 
the world: and the Latin American countries are in the periphery of the economic system….Why do I call 
the United States, the cyclical center? Because from this country, given its magnitude and economic 
characteristics, start the expansionary and contractionary impulses of world economic life and 
                                                        
55  Following his demise from the Central Bank in 1943 and until his ECLA appointment he remained committed to teaching and was 
also an international consultant. According to him, he began at this time re-thinking his past experiences and developing his 
periphery-center and development theories. See Pollock et al. (2002, p. 549). 
56  Note that contrary to mainstream theory and practice inflation and more specifically, a low and stable rate of inflation is not included, 
as part of the aims of monetary policy.  Nonetheless, maintaining full employment and the highest possible rate of growth of output 
do inevitable lead to situations of inflation and output trade-offs. Throughout the period covered in this article Prebisch never 
abandoned the orthodox belief that inflation is the product of fiscal deficits. See for example RP. Vol. IV, p. 229. 
57  See Prebisch (1943, p. 7; RP. Vol. IV pp. 209-214). In line with the Balance-of-Payments approach he argued that a country like 
Argentina needed to import in order to export.  Had Prebisch been aware that in his framework, formalized in part by Eq.2, above 
exports (X) can equal the propensity to export times the level of external demand (or income), as in McCombie and A.P. Thirlwall 
(1994), he could have been a step away from realizing that a policy for general of economic growth, could be based, partly, on the 
reduction in the import coefficient, on an increase in the export coefficient or in a combination of both. The reduction in the import 
coefficient may well be conceived alternatively as in an increase in the productivity of imports. In many respects the simple 
numerical example presented in the section on the Coefficient of expansion and the foreign trade multiplier above prefigures the 
literature on the balance of payments constraint to growth. 
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particularly those of the Latin American periphery, whose countries are under the influence of those 
impulses just as they been had before, when Great Britain had the role of main cyclical center.”58 
The universal or global cycle was thus divided into two phases with different characteristics, one 
affecting the center and the other, the periphery, that is, Latin American countries.59  Moreover, since 
the periphery faced a binding external constraint while the center did not, they faced markedly different 
restrictions in their use of domestic policy space. 
Faced with a contraction of economic activity and price declines the cyclical center could always 
resort to the use of monetary instruments such as the money supply or interest rates without regard for 
exchange rate parity or international reserve adequacy conditions.60 Contrarily, the periphery, bereft of 
the use of this privilege by the binding character of its external constraint, had to turn to the use of 
exchange rate variations or quantitative restrictions and controls (RP, Vol. IV. pp. 225-226). 
Prebisch also contemplated a policy of reserve accumulation by the countries of the periphery. In 
fact he argued, very much in line with his earlier views, that the countries of the periphery had ‘the 
responsibility’ to generate the financial resources during the upward phase of the cycle (including 
international reserves) to face and weather contractions (Vol. IV. p.232). 
Prebisch also thought that the White and Keynes plans for a new international order had great 
merit in their proposal of a credit system allowing temporary alleviations of balance of payments 
imbalances. However, according to him, they failed to address the more fundamental problem of 
creating a balanced and equitable trading system.61 
As he progressed on his cycle thought processes Prebisch continued to underscore the relevance 
of a general cycle theory but argued that a cycle theory must converge towards a more general ‘dynamic 
theory.’ Prebisch understood that the growth process of a capitalist economy was that of a growth cycle 
and that this process embedded the entire spectrum of economic activity. In his own words (RP, Vol. IV, 
p. 414): 
“Each time I am more convinced that the cycle is the way through which a capitalist economy grows. A 
capitalist economy expands only in wave motion and any perturbation…can only give rise to a wave 
motion movement. …If the cycle is the way to grow…and if the economy moves incessantly in this 
manner, it would seem that all the joint events of the economy, not only those of production and 
employment, but also those of distribution, must be integrated into a general dynamic theory.”  
Prebisch’s outlined his dynamic economic theory in 1949 but it remained at the level of a series 
of lectures notes and conferences. Nonetheless, it included, albeit at a rough stage, besides the center-
periphery dichotomy, and the ideas that the main constraint to economic expansion in the periphery was 
the balance of payments, the workings of technological progress in both development poles, as well as 
other notions and concepts that were key to justify state led industrialization and also regional 
integration, central tenets of his manifesto “The Economic Development of Latin America and Some of 
its Main Problems” and to ECLA(C) development thinking. 
                                                        
58  The center-periphery cycle dichotomy was a historical and evolutionary concept. Not all developed countries belonged to the center. 
Indeed, Prebisch asked himself if Canada should be part of the periphery or of the center. Also, besides a main cyclical center 
Prebisch introduced the notion of second cyclical center a role he attributed to Great Britain. See RP, Vol. IV., pp.224-231. 
59  Prebisch did not develop the different phase characteristics of the center and periphery. 
60  This is remindful of debate surrounding the policy of quantitative easing pursued since 2008 by the Federal Reserve Bank of the 
United States. 
61  As he put it (Prebisch, 1943, pp. 8-9): “…in spite of their great merits they [the Keynes and White plans] do not resolve the 
fundamental problem that depends essentially on the restoration of international trade. If the United States does not buy as much 
from the rest of the world as the world buys from the United States there is no monetary system that will resist in the long run…” 
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